Interesting article in The Times about the War of the Roses battle of Towton. It is still the bloodiest battle on English soil ever. Interesting information on the re-enactors and amateur historians too.
It is not far from Marston Moor if you want to make a day of it.

I noticed an article in The Independent (UK) about the lesser known Australian contribution to the Somme battles near the end of the First World War. It's the 90th anniversary and it seems that there will be a special commemoration in the week leading up to the 25th of April at Viller-Bretonneux.

I may be dusting down the big cat for the first big ride of the year.

El Gato Negro

I finally got to ride the new BMW F 800 GS and what a bike! BMW have done themselves very proud. This bike is all it has been cracked up to be. It was certainly worth the wait, even if it is a little too late for me personally... I'll explain that later.

I rode a Sunset Yellow/Black schemed bike with BattleWing tyres, ABS, heated grips, on-board computer, full BMW expandable panniers and top box. The bike I rode has the lowered seat which I wish was the higher one, but it didn't cause me too many problems with leg bend (I'm 6'3" with bad knees). I would definitely get the higher seat if I was buying, but the down side is that I think that would cause more wind exposure.

I picked up the bike from Bahnstormer today in the middle of a fierce storm we're having here in the south of England. It was raining hard with severe wind gusts. I rode my 2001 BMW F 650 GS along the hedge row protected back roads down to Bahnstormer to avoid most of the wind. However, when I road the F 800 GS, I took it out in the open more (A32, A272, A31) and it was a sturdy feeling bike and I didn't get blown around as much, even with the panniers and top box providing a bigger target.

The bike sounds quite tame when you first fire it up and idle it, but that soon gives way to a nice little growl when the tyres snatch some asphalt. The first bit of the ride along the A31 told me it was a BMW. It has a nice, tight build to it. Nothing rattles or feels loose. Very firm, but also a little "flickable," like the 2006 KTM 950 Adventure that I ride most days. I was also a little skeptical that the F 800 GS would be as much fun as the KTM, but it is for a rider like me. What I mean by that is that I cannot wring as much out of the KTM as a pro can, so the F 800 GS is about the same as the KTM 950 Adventure for me in the "kick up the backside" acceleration stakes. It is all I need for sure. The curves of the A272 then showed me that the BMW is also as comfortable at cornering as the KTM. In comparison to my old F 650 GS, there is no comparison. The F 800 GS is in a whole other league. More on that league status later.

I turned up a couple of farm tracks near the fields where the Battle of Cheriton occurred on 29 March 1644. This isn't real off-roading or even real green-laning, but I couldn't really trash out a test ride bike, could I? Below is a picture of the bike near the point where Sir Henry Bard made his fatal mistake.

I have ridden this area many times on my 650 and KTM, so I know the area and roads well. The F 800 GS is as sure footed as anything I have ridden, even with the stock BattleWings. The mucky farm tracks and debris strewn forest track I rode ( Badshear, Scrubbs and North End Farm Lanes ) gives a good feel for the bike's capabilities. It is supremely balanced and the under seat tank keeps it from feeling tippy as the beefy KTM is wont to feel in far less strenuous situations. Again, this is definitely not off-roading, but it is a good indicator of the most strenuous work that many of these bikes will ever see. It is also fairly typical of the type of battlefield touring that I do.

Back out on the A31, I was able to open the bike up a little and I can say that it certainly rivals the KTM for quickness. I'm not a real hair on fire rider, but I would hazard a guess that it could outrun all but the best sport bikes with a good rider on it. It is really good fun. There is quite a bit of chest level wind buffeting, but it is manageable. I think one would need to consider the heightened screen for extended touring.

To wrap it up, I think the BMW F 800 GS is a superb bike. I'd rate it 6 stars on a 5 star scale. It is a step and half up from the old F 650 GS and is only a quarter step down from the R 1200 GS in its "GS factor." However, this may be the only rub I can find with is wonderful bike. Will R 1200 GS owners trade down to get a F 800 GS? I kind of doubt it. The 1100/1150/1200 bunch is a world to itself. Will the old F 650 GS crowd buy it over the NEW F 650 GS (with an 800 engine)? Not sure. I think this bike will largely attract new BMW riders ( which may be what they are trying to do ), but not so many of the existing ones. I think this bike is a real competitor to the KTM 950 Adventure and to the riders who just could not bring themselves to buy a boxer engine. I think this bike will set BMW up well for the future, but I'm not sure it will be a huge seller right away.

So will a 2001 BMW F 650 GS, a 2006 KTM 950 Adventure and a (USA-based )2003 Triumph Tiger owning rider ( i.e. me, aka the Battlefield Biker ) buy this bike? Probably not. Why? I waited for several years on the rumor that BMW was going to bring out a conventional 2 cylinder GS, before I bought the KTM last year. They just waited too long for me. I need to get some more value out of that bike, before I can justify buying a new bike. It is a great bike, and yes, it is better than the KTM to me, but it is not so much better to justify a £3,500 differential. Yes, I know, it is supposed to be great value, but once you get the extras on, it is is not far off the price of a new KTM 990 Adventure with the extra kit on offer as it is so often is these days. I'll enjoy the KTM for another year or two and pick up a used F 800 GS then. It's a shame, but it is life in the real world. Hope BMW factored that into their sales projections!

I love the F 800 GS. I think it will bring in a whole new class of GS riders and will solidify BMW's hold on this market. However, the Battlefield Biker will be seeing Europe on a KTM and the US on a Tiger for the next year or two. Below, may be the only picture you see of the Battlefield Biker with a BMW F 800 GS anytime soon.

The Creek War was part of the War of 1812, because the Americans believed, with good reason, that the British and Spanish were coaxing the Red Stick (anti-US) Creeks along with supplies and guidance. The fact that the Tohopeka (Horseshoe Bend) stronghold on the Tallapoosa River in Alabama (see a map of the area) was fortified with European style battlements re-enforced this belief.

After the tactically brutal and ugly fights at Emuckfaw and Enitachopco in January 1814, Andrew Jackson gathered his new forces and had another go at the Red Stick Creeks led by the Prophet Monahell and Chief Menawa with the possible inclusion of the famed William Weatherford (Red Eagle), a half Scottish, half Creek warrior. Jackson was determined to make this campaign the last major one in the area by destroying the Red Stick Creek force at its very stronghold and defended by its best warriors and leaders.

Jackson took off from Fort Strother in mid March with new Tennessee volunteers from the eastern part of that state, the 39th U.S. Infantry, Cherokees and White Stick (pro-US) Creeks. Jackson's target was to be the stronghold at the horseshoe shaped bend on the Tallapoosa River that the Creeks called Tohopeka. The new forces were important, because Jackson's previous foray into this wilderness was with Tennnessee volunteers who had many complaints about their pay and enlistment periods. This new force was more motivated and professional. The plan was to form an envelopement and was designed to trap the Red Sticks in the confines of the river bow (see a map of the arrayed forces).

Jackson sent his trusty number two, John Coffee, the White Stick Creeks, some Cherokees and the dragoons to the far side (southern) of the river to feint a river crossing. Jackson took the main force to attack the breastworks head on from the north. Jackson opened up with his limited artillery, but his small guns just bounced shot off the timbered works. However, the sound of the guns excited some of Coffee's force and they managed to swim the Tallapoosa and steal some canoes. This allowed a landing and cut off the Red Sticks' main retreat option. Whilst Coffee was harrying the Red Sticks near the river, Jackson ordered a charge on the works. Jackson's force was then able to use the timber for protection themselves as they fired through the portals from the outside. Finally, a courageous push over the top that included Sam Houston (who was seriously wounded) succeeded in breaching the Creek perimeter with substantial forces. The Red Stick forces fought a determined, but doomed defense inside the stronghold with Jackson even levelling his artillery at point blank range into the huts used as a last stand.
The battle resulted in the largest death toll of Native Americans (557 +) in a single battle throughout all of the Indian wars. Monahell was killed (possibly by Menawa who was fed up with Prophetic devices rather than fighting), Menawa was severely wounded, but escaped and William Weatherford escaped only to walk into Fort Jackson (formerly Fort Toulouse) a few months later to surrender. Weatherford was to play a key role in encouraging many other Red Sticks to give up to the Americans.

Horsehoe Bend is seen as the last of the Creek nation living independently in their ancestral grounds, but this particular Indian War will forever be associated with the War of 1812, because of the winning General. Clearing out the Creeks would allow Jackson to focus on New Orleans nearly a year later with glorious results for Old Hickory.

Motorcycle Ride Recommendation

Try this "figure 8" ride starting and ending at Fort Toulouse / Jackson State Historic Site. This takes in the scenic Alabama State Routes 9 and 22 as well as the Horseshoe Bend National Military Park.

Book Recommendation: The Creek War, 1813-1814 from AbeBooks.com or Amazon.com

Map Recommendation: Alabama Atlas and Gazetteer 2006 from AbeBooks.com or Amazon.com

Accor Hotels in the Montgomery, Alabama area

The early part of the American Revolutionary War was fought mostly in the North of the colonies, but after a series of defeats, the British decided to focus on the southern colonies in their persistant belief that Loyalist sympathies ran deeper there than the North. The British had built up a string of victories in the south by early 1781 by chasing down southern militias and defeating them one by one. General Washington sent one of his best Generals, Nathaniel Greene south to revive the Patriot effort. Greene had tried to separate his forces and hoped to catch the British off guard by making them attack him piecemeal. This had had some success, namely at Cowpens two months earlier, but it was getting harder and harder to avoid a major showdown with the British main force. After strategically retreating across South and North Carolina and preserving his force, Greene decided to turn and face his pursuer, Redcoat General Lord Cornwallis. Cornwallis was sure that if he could corner Greene's force and inflict a decisive defeat on the Rebels, he could soon claim the American south for the British cause. The field for this critical battle was in the small hamlet of Guilford Courthouse, North Carolina.

On the cold morning of 15 March 1781, Greene deployed his mixed militia and Continental Army force of approximately 4,500 in three lines in depth. The first line was North Carolina militia, the second Virginia militia and the final line was mainly Continentals. Cornwallis took his 1,900 British and German professional soldiers and attacked head on, breaking through the first line quickly, but with serious losses that he could ill afford. The second line held longer and bled the British further. However, the British broke through and finally reached the Continentals where a fierce give and take erupted with attacks and counter-attacks. The resulting mass of fighting men confused the situation to the point that Cornwallis felt that he needed to break up the two armies with grape shot fired into the middle of it. The artillery killed indiscriminately, but had the intended effect of separating the armies. At this point, Greene decided to pull away and save his force. Cornwallis stood victorious on the field, but strategically hamstrung.

From this victory, Cornwallis headed for the coast for re-supply for his depleted force. The condition of his army led him to begin his doomed Virginia campaign which would end later in the year with his surrender at Yorktown.

Motorcycle Ride Recommendation

Check out this ride that leads to the Guilford Courthouse National Military Park through the Colonial Heritage Byway.

Book Recommendation: Guilford Courthouse: North Carolina from AbeBooks.com or Amazon.com

Map Recommendation: North Carolina Atlas and Gazetteer 2006 from AbeBooks.com or Amazon.com

Accor Hotels in the Greensboro, North Carolina area

By early 1915, the lines in northern France had become static and the trench warfare that WWI is known for had commenced. Many soldiers and officers found themselves not only green, but found their senior leadership green in the tactics of the trench as well. New ideas had to be considered and new tactics developed to break the enemy lines for any offensive to succeed. The British First Army, under the command of the often maligned General Douglas Haig, was given the task of taking the immediate German positions, Neuve Chapelle and finally Aubers ridge. The First Army was made up of British, Canadians and Indians.

Although the battle is not often associated with the major battles of the First World War, it is highly significant in the analysis of the planning, technology and tactical advances of the time. The battle exhibited major breakthroughs in four key areas.

• The German lines were mapped extensively by aerial reconnaissance by a British air arm that was in its infancy. This allowed;
• Detailed maps to be distributed to the ground forces which contained phase lines and timed intervals for movements which were co-ordinated with;
• Air support in the attack and;
• Heavy artillery preparation of targets in advance with the lifting and shifting of fires in time with infantry movements. More rounds were sent skyward in the battle than in all of the Boer War.

These innovations paid off at first with Haig taking the immediate objective of the German line salient and then the village of Neuve Chapelle. However, the attack bogged down soon thereafter, well before reaching the final objective of the Aubers ridge. A competent German counter-attack was partly the casue, but unforced errors also came into play. There were several tactical explanations for the halt that are common to many battlefields;

• Poor weather on the second day limited aerial observation and support which contributed to;
• Poor communications that kept the leadership from knowing where things were progressing properly and where they weren't which led to;
• Bad tactical intelligence that led some areas to be allotted more troops than needed and others less than needed which led to;
• The fog of war where things tend to freeze on the senior decision level, but local fighting goes on, but is uncoordinated with the larger picture.

The battle was a limited tactical win for the Brits, but at a heavy cost of approximately 12,000 casualties. In the longer term Neuve Chapelle became the professional template for a new set of tactics that would become prevalent for the rest of the war.

Motorcycle Ride Recommendation

This is a great ride when you are going somewhere else in France. It is only 60 miles from Calais and can be seen on the way to the south of France, Paris or Belgium with only a minor detour. From Calais, head to Neuve Chapelle, then take the following circular ride of the area. This is not a spectacularly scenic ride, but you get to ride along the British front line from Neuve Chapelle to Fleurbaix (with a British Cemetary in Fauquissart), then see the Aubers ridge objective, then down to the pivot point in the line at La Bassee.

Book Recommendation: The Battle of Neuve Chapelle - French Flanders from AbeBooks.co.uk

Map Recommendation: Michelin Map No. 236 Nord de la France from AbeBooks.co.uk

Accor Hotels in the Lille area

After defeat in Russia in 1812, Napoleaon was being chased by the European Allies across central Europe and into France by early 1814. The Prussian and Russian forces were led by the Prussian Marshal Blucher and were threatening Paris by early 1814. Napoleon was fighting for his very survival.

After several battles on the trot, some won, some lost, Blucher occupied the town of Laon. Laon was trategically important because it was a major communications crossroads near Paris. Holding Laon would give Blucher the logistical base to attack into Paris. Napoleon obviously felt it could not remain held by the enemy. Laon was also a tactical stronghold due to its placement on a plateau with steep slopes for defense.

On the first day of the battle (9th), both sides fought skirmishes for the small towns around Laon. Both sides missed opportunities for exploitation, but the sun set on the Allies holding the town. On the second day (10th), Napoleon decided to try the ploy that had worked at Craonne a few days earlier. Napoleon sent Marshal Auguste Marmont to deliver the flank attack. Blucher saw what was happening and threw a decisive counter-attack at Marmont and nearly annihilated his forces were it not for an exceptional defense by a small number of the Old Guard. The battle continued, but Napoleon could not dislodge Blucher from Laon and decided to retire.

The loss at Laon was not the end of Napoleon in France, but Blucher and the Allies were tightening the ring around Paris and Laon would provide an important link.

Motorcycle Ride Recommendation

Check out the wooded circular route on the "D" roads south of Laon.

Book Recommendation: 1814: The French Campaign from AbeBooks.co.uk or Amazon.co.uk

Map Recommendation: Michelin Map 306: Laon et al from AbeBooks.co.uk

Accor Hotels in the Central Florida area

By the end of 1861, the Union forces had secured Missouri by routing the Missouri militia that favored secession. In early 1862, the Union commander, General Samuel Curtis moved his Army of the Southwest into northwest Arkansas to take the fight to the Confedrates and secure Missouri from Rebel cross border incursions.

Newly appointed Confederate Army of the West commander, General Earl Van Dorn decided to take his numerically superior, but logistically inferior forces to the northwest of Arkansas and push the Union back onto the back foot in both Arkansas and Missouri.

After several skirmishes in February and early March, 1862, Curtis settled on favorable ground to the east of Pea Ridge, Arkansas. Van Dorn knew it was a good position, so decided to split his forces in an attempt to draw Curtis into a weaker position.

On day one of the battle, Curtis took the north and west of the position by heading off a flanking movement. The day was carried by the quick movement of the Union forces, the loss of two Confedrate Genrals and the capture of a Colonel. Van Dorn led the other Confederate column to take the south and east near Elkhorn Tavern. On day two, Curtis regrouped and attacked Elkhorn tavern with heavy artillery support. Van Dorn held the position but at a tremendous cost in casualties and ammunition and eventually had to retreat and leave the position to Curtis.

The Union continued to hold the area and the strategically important state of Missouri for most of the rest of the war.

Motorcycle Ride Recommendation

Begin or end your ride with the tour of the battlefield(also available as an online tour). Outside of the Pea Ridge Battlefield National Military Parkpark take a through the loop ride through the Hobbs State Park and around Beaver Lake.

Book Recommendation: Pea Ridge: Civil War Campaign in the West from AbeBooks.com or Amazon.com

Map Recommendation: Arkansas Atlas and Gazetteer 2006 from AbeBooks.com or Amazon.com

Accor Hotels in the Rogers area

On 4 March 1941, 500 troops of the British 3 and 4 Commando units with the company of 50 Norwegian sailors landed on the Lofoten Islands off the coast of northwestern Norway to destroy fish oil (used in German ammunition) refining factories and boats. The raid was a rousing success and almost captured a German enigma machine, until the German captain of the trawler Krebs threw his machine overboard. The raid did yield a couple of extra enigma rotors which helped in the longer term struggle to break the German codes.
For a war weary nation, though, the raid gave the Brits their first taste of real success against the Germans and put the Germans on notice that fighting the Btrits would not be a cake-walk.

Motorcycle Ride Recommendation

I've been to Narvik and northwards on the E-6 and eastwards on the E-10, but I have not travelled to the Lofoten Islands. If the roads there are the same as the rest of Norway, you'll be smiling.
Take the E-6 and E-10 from Narvik to Melbu. Then take the ferry from Melbu to Fiskebol. Then take the E-10 from Fiskebol to Svolvaer / Vagan, where some of the Commandos came ashore. Check out the Lofoten museum dedicated to the military actions in the area at Svolvaer.

Book Recommendation: Enigma: The Battle for the Code from AbeBooks.co.uk or Amazon.co.uk

Map Recommendation: Norway North Road Map: Narvik No. 3 from AbeBooks.co.uk

In early 1776, the American colonists were trying hard to limit the area in which British forces, based in Boston, could operate. As long as the British could retreat to the safety of Boston and its harbor, General George Washington would not be able to control the eastern end of Massachusetts. From Boston, British General Howe could re-supply from the sea and conduct operations with Boston as a base. In fact, Howe had taken nearby Bunker Hill (albeit with heavy losses) and was planning more of these types of operations in early March 1776.

Washington knew bold, unexpected and decisive action was needed to disrupt Howe's plans. In Late 1775, Washington had dispatched Artillery Colonel Henry Knox to Fort Ticonderoga, a captured British garrsion, to bring the impressive array of artillery to Boston as soon as possible. Washington had probably expected it in late Spring, but the big man Knox drove his oxen and men hard over the lakes, rivers and frozen terrain of New England to get the 44 guns, 14 mortars and one howitzer to the outskirts of Boston by early February 1776. Knowing good fortune when he saw it, Washington wanted to take aggressive action immediately. Washington wanted to conduct a daring cross Charles River attack from Cambridge, but his council of war thought it too risky. Washington's leaders agreed on the decisive action, but wanted to do it without significant risks to their small and largely untested militias. The compromise was to take aggressive action on Dorchester Heights which overlook Boston from the southeast.

On 2 and 3 March 1776, the Patriots fired the Knox artillery on the British in Boston and the Brits returned the favor. Washington had prepared a river crossing unit to the west of Boston to provide relief, if Howe tried to break out and disrupt the Dorchester Heights plan, although it seemed as if he had no idea what was going on. Whilst the artillery duelled, heavy, but transportable, fortifications were being fabricated down the hill. On the night of 4 March 1776, General Artemas Ward's forces used an old ploy of Washington's and put straw on the wheels of his wagons' wheels to move quietly and began occupying Dorchester Heights from neighboring Roxbury. With a mammoth effort and 300 ox carts of material moved up the hill, the rebels had constructed 4 works on the heights and the flanks. By daylight on the 5 March, General Howe awoke to incomplete, but substantial works on the southeastern hills overlooking the harbor and the city. Howe was reported as saying, "The rebels have done more in one night than my whole army would have done in a month."

The British Admiral Molyneaux Shulddown informed Howe that he could not maintain his ships in the harbor with such a threat. In the following days, Howe planned a quick counter-attack, but bad weather or a bout of under confidence or both made him quit Boston. By 17 March, in agreement with Washington not to destroy Boston if allowed to leave unmolested, the British had left Boston on ships for Halifax, Nova Scotia. They would be back, but for now Boston was in the Patriots hands and the radicals of the American colonies had a lot to crow about.

Motorcycle Ride Recommendation

Try Massachusetts state route 3A (MA-SR-3A) from Dorchester Heights down to Plymouth where the colony began.

Book Recommendation: The Glorious Cause from AbeBooks.com or Amazon.com

Map Recommendation: Massachusetts Atlas and Gazetteer 2006 from AbeBooks.com or Amazon.com

Accor Hotels in the Boston area

By early 1864, Lincoln was despairing that he could find no General to prosecute the Union's war against the South in the eastern theatre. All of his leaders around the Potomac seemed to be frozen with indecision and a fear of failure. Much to his delight, a plan from a junior Cavalry General, H. Judson Kilpatrick, came into his view through Secretary of War Stanton. Kilpatrick knew that his immediate superiors would either poo-poo the idea or steal it as their own, so he approached Lincoln's adminstration directly through back channels. Kilpatrick was proposing a daring raid into the mouth of the lion to snatch Federal prisoners held in deplorable conditions in Confederate held Richmond. Kilpatrick's plan suggested more as well. Stanton and Lincoln were attracted by the idea that a raid into Richmond, apart from freeing prisoners, would also serve as a huge propaganda victory. Kilpatrick was summoned to Washington for a private meeting with Stanton and given the go ahead. Kilpatrick's superior's were not amused, although had no choice but to support him as he had the direct support of Lincoln.

Kilpatrick, like many Cavalry officers from the North and South, had dreams of great daring-do, but was known to some peers and subordinates as "KillCavalry" for his reckless behaviour. However, many, including Lincoln, believed that more of this type of risk taking was necessary to dislodge a stubborn foe in Virginia. Kilpatrick had no problem attracting another officer of similar ideals, named Colonel Ulric Dahlgren. Dahlgren, the son of a Union Admiral, had made his name in previous engagements, including chasing Lee's forces out of Maryland after Gettysburg, and lost a leg for his work. Having recovered and sporting a prosthetic, Dahlgren was ready for more grandiose riding.

The operation started just before midnight on the night of the 28th of February 1864. They were aided by a diversionary attack further west by General Sedgewick and a Cavalry Brigade commander by the name of George Armstrong Custer. The diversion drew the Rebels west and cleared a path for Kilpatrick and Dahlgren. Custer was especially effective in drawing the Confederates on a wild goose chase as far away as Charlottesville. Leaving Elys Ford at the Rapidan River, north of Chancellorsville, Kilpatrick and Dahlgren set out at a good cavalry pace and reached Spotsylvania courthouse by leap day, 1864. Here, they split forces with Kilpatrick heading straight into Richmond from the north with 7/8ths of the force. Dahlgren took a wide, westerly path to enter Richmond from the southwest with a force of apprximately 500. The idea was to give the impression that the city was being attacked from multiple sides and cause panic long enough to get the prisoners out. If they could destroy a few things in Richmond, all the better.

Kilpatrick continued well through appalling weather of sleet and high winds. Dahlgren met a slave boy to guide him over a ford-able point on the James River and was on time, so was feeling pretty high at this point. Kilpatrick fired flares to see if Dahlgen would respond, but the weather was so bad that the flares could only be seen locally. Both drove on, but Dahlgren soon came to grief as the guide led him to a point at the rain swollen James that they could not ford. Dahlgren was thrown off track and was furious. The boy probably just did not know that the river was that high, but this did not appease Dahlgren. In a fit of rage, Dahlgren hung the boy for treachery. Unable to find a fording point, Dahlgren was stuck and could not complete his mission. Kilpatrick had entered north Richmond by now and encountered a force of old men and clerks, but misread the situation as regular troops. In an uncharacteristic delay, Kilpatrick hesitated whilst he waited for the signal from Dahlgren that the southwest attack was on. The "Dad's Army" force held on well and long enough for re-enforcements to arrive and drive Kilpatrick off. Kilpatrick now decided to avoid the fate of the prisoners he had come to save, but left Dahlgren in a bind by pulling back. Kilpatrick was harried all the way back to Union lines, but Dahlgren and many of his 500 were to die trying to elude the Confederates.

The mission was a failure on the tactical as well as strategic front, but it was to get worse. The Rebels searched Dahlgren's body and allegedly found orders to destroy Richmond and kill Jefferson Davis and his cabinet. The Union denied the existence of such orders, but the outrage in the South had the opposite effect of the propaganda coup Lincoln had hoped for.

Motorcycle Ride Recommendation

I call this ride the "Rapidan Return." It covers the path Kilpatrick took to Richmond and then passes over the James River near Goochland where Dalgren had hoped to cross. It continues on the beautiful VA state routes 6 and 20 to Charlottesville where Custer worked the area. the ride finishes near the battlefield parks of Wilderness, Chancellorsville and Spotsylvania.

Book Recommendation: The Dahlgren Affair from AbeBooks.com or Amazon.com

Map Recommendation: Virginia Atlas and Gazetteer 2006 from AbeBooks.com or Amazon.com

Accor Hotels in the Richmond area

Battle of Stow on the Wold - 21 March 1646

If the battles of Naseby and Marston Moor were the decisive thrusts and Langport the mortal stroke, then Stow on the Wold would be the coup de grace. In the Spring of 1646, King Charles I was getting ever more desperate to hold the Royalist cause together whilst waiting for the long promised relief forces from Ireland, Scotland and France. Lord Jacob Astley took command of the Royalist forces in the west and began to gather up the remnants from the handful of Royalist garrisons still left in the west. As one could imagine at this point in the war, Royalist morale was pretty low. However, Astley, a stalwart of the Royalist commanders and an experienced soldier, was able to cobble together a force of 3,000.
Astley was trying to reach Oxford with his force when Parliament got wind of it. What ensued was a period of thrusting and parrying along the river Avon as Astley tried to evade certain defeat. Finally, Astley had no choice, but to stop and fight the harrying Roundhead forces of Colonel Thomas Morgan and Sir William Brereton. Astley chose a hill to the northwest of Stow on the Wold straddling the present day A424.
The Roundhead forces, who were slightly smaller, lined up to the northwest of Astley's position also along the current route of the A424. The Roundheads, flush with the confidence of an army on the brink of total victory, charged up the hill at the Royalist positions, near the present day Greenfield Farm. Initially, the Royalists held and even pushed the Parliamentary foot back. However, the Roundhead cavalry under Brereton rolled up the Royalist cavalry on the right flank. The Royalist cavalry fled the field and the infantry fought a running retreat southeasterly back to Stow square.
Finally, Astley sat down on an ancient cross monument in the square and declared, "You have done your work, boys, and may go play, unless you will fall out among yourselves." This was a fitting end to the last major battle of the First Civil War from the man who was most quoted at the first major battle. At Edgehill, Astley prayed, "Oh Lord, thou knowest how busy I must be this day, if I forget thee, do not thou forget me."

Rides, Routes and Waypoints

40-45 miles, depending on the options chosen. Take the A424 north out of Burford (Burford is on the A40 between Oxford and Cheltenham) towards Stow. Go through Stow and stay on the A424. The A424 splits the battlefield in half northwest of Stow. Turn right onto the lane to Donnington for a look at the battlefield from Roundhead lines back to the south towards Stow. Continue on Donnington Lane to the A429 and turn right to go back into Stow. Visit the town square where the surrender took place. Follow the A429 southwest out of Stow to Bourton on the Water to complete the Cotswold experience. There are hundreds of small lanes with beautiful scenery, pick one and lose yourself!
Use Ordnance Survey Landranger 163. The battlefield is centred on SP 191272. If using a road map, the battlefield is 20 miles east of Cheltenham.

Battle of Cheriton - 29 March 1644

Around 27 March 1644, the Royalist forces of Lord Hopton, joined by the Earl of Forth had succeeded in halting William Waller's Parliamentary forces from securing Winchester by blocking the main road between London and Winchester near Alresford. Two days of skirmishing in the area left Waller's army near the village of Hinton Ampner and Hopton's army northeast of Cheriton with pickets on a ridge overlooking Hinton Ampner to the south.
Hopton's pickets and Waller*s patrols skirmished in the night of 28/29 March and Waller had flanked Hopton's pickets on the south ridge to the point of making it untenable. Thus the day of the battle began with Waller on the south ridge and Hopton on the north ridge. Upon seeing the ground between the two forces, Waller saw that Cheriton Wood would be the key to Hopton's left flank and dispatched 1,000 musketeers there. Understanding this threat, Hopton countered with 1,000 musketeers of his own under Colonel Matthew Appleyard. The two forces met in the dense Cheriton Wood and by all accounts fought a fierce hand-to-hand melee with Appleyard*s forces securing the ground. Hopton had been frustrated by previous attempts to bring his old friend, Waller, to battle, due to Waller's pessimistic nature and previous defeats, most notably Roundway Down. Alas, Hopton would be frustrated, but not by Waller this time.
Royalist Sir Henry Bard, on his own initiative, led his regiment of foot on a ill-starred attack from the right on Sir Arthur Haselrige*s regiment of horse, known as the "lobsters" for their 3/4 armour suits. Haselrige made Bard pay for his folly and destroyed the entire regiment in plain sight of the Royalists. The Royalists were so horrified by what they saw in front of them that they felt compelled to send reenforcements to Bard. The Roundheads met the challenge and soon the entire front became engaged between the two ridges. Parrying between the two forces ended up in close quartered fighting along the hedges. Meanwhile, several cavalry actions played out over a period of hours with the Parliamentary cavalry gaining the upper hand. Finally, Waller's infantry enveloped the flanks and forced Hopton to salvage his troops and guns with an orderly retreat up today*s Scrubbs Lane towards Basing House, passing the point where the commemorative stone sits today.

Rides, Routes and Waypoints

40-50 miles, depending on the options chosen. Take the A31 east out of Winchester towards Alton. Just before Alton, take a right on the A32 and go to West Meon. At the intersection with the A272, turn right and go to Cheriton. Near Cheriton, take a right on the B3046 and enter Cheriton. On the north side of Cheriton, take a right onto the North End Farm lane, which will turn into Badshear Lane and then Cheriton Lane. At the intersection of Cherition and Scrubbs Lane is a battle marker. For more riding, follow Scrubbs lane up to Bishops Sutton, turn left on the B3047 to Alresford, then turn right on the B3046 and go to Basingstoke following the Royalist line of retreat.
Use Ordnance Survey Landranger 185. The battlefield is centred on SU 598294. If using a road map, the battlefield is located northeast of Cheriton village.